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ABSTRACT 
The term genocide implies attacks on only four groups – national, racial, ethnic and 
religious – enumerated in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. In terms of protection of political group, severe political persecutions 
targeting a certain political group would not establish a successful genocide charge in courts and 
international courts have rendered judgements applying crimes against humanity to such 
atrocities. However, it is important to consider the possibility of protecting political groups 
regarding the victims in the North Korean political camps were selected on political grounds and 
their groupness is similar to other characteristics of the protected groups. It seems plausible to 
convict the genocide crime in North Korean context due to the unique nature of the incidents. 
This thesis is, therefore, to analyze possible accusation of genocide crime in North 
Korean political camps in order to bring more tangible discussions to provide justice to the 
detained in the camps. It aims to demonstrate the detained in the political camps may constitute a 
political group and the Genocide Convention should be interpreted to include them, based on the 
limited factual descriptions in the camps. It was impossible to conduct a direct investigation in 
the camp sites since the state persists to remain exclusive, however, the most reliable findings 
were found by national and international authorities including the United Nations. In addition to 
the criminal charge of crimes against humanity found by the authorities, this thesis ultimately 
focuses on establishing genocide charge to the inhumane atrocities in the state political camps 
with more flexible and individual approach to the case. Although it is too challenging to bring a 
new interpretation or amendment to the existing Convention, the research conducted in this 
thesis hopefully predicts domestic or transitional justice procedure to incorporate the genocide 
term in a way which this thesis suggests, for the fairness and justice in North Korea’s future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Buergenthal, a former International Criminal Court judge and survivor of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp, once spoke to the Washington Post as an author of a report about 
North Korean human rights violations released by the War Crimes Committee of the 
International Bar Association. He described the situations in North Korean political camps as 
even worse than what he witnessed and experienced in his lifetime.1 There are tortures, physical 
violence, brainwashing, extremely forced labors, disease, child segregation, forced abortion and 
direct killings against the inmates in the North Korean political camps. Despite this list of the 
atrocities, the current interpretation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of the Genocide would preclude a finding that genocide is occurring within the North 
Korean political camps. 
The very beginning of this thesis arose from a similar question: why would killing masses 
of people be less punishable than killing a single person? It is hard but true to believe a massive 
scale of killings may fail to receive justice in courts unlike individual murder cases. Such gap 
between the ethical awareness and the legal responsibility would be provoked by the strict 
application of the legal definition and interpretation of the genocide resulting in limited space to 
render necessary protections. Thus, this led questions into exploring language of the Genocide 
Convention; is it possible to provide an explanation for why generalized harms in the North 
Korean political camps do not establish a crime of genocide? 
 
“Article II 
                                                          
1 Katie Dangerfield, North Korea Defector Says Prisoners Fed to dogs, Women Forced to Have Abortions, GLOBAL 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://globalnews.ca/news/3911993/north-korea-defector-says-prisoners-fed-to-dogs-
women-forced-to-have-abortions/. 
2 
 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”2 
 
In the article II of the Genocide Convention, the first paragraph explicitly provides definition of 
certain types of groups to protect. The enumeration for limited scope of protection seems 
reasonable because genocide is “the crime of crimes”, owning strong rhetorical power to provoke 
tangible solutions over the world.3 It is also a reflection of the historical experience under 
Hitler’s Nazi government which inflicted innocent human beings by classifying them on the 
basis of nationality or race. The Convention’s obvious objective is to protect the existence of the 
groups and appreciate the importance of minorities in modern democratic societies. However, 
since some groups are not entitled to receive the Genocide Convention’s protection, the 
international courts have convicted the perpetrators who conducted genocidal inflicts of crimes 
against humanity to protect excluded groups and several advocates have argued that customary 
international law could protect a wider set of groups than the Convention. Some states have 
attempted to prosecute genocide criminals in national courts with its legislation regardless of the 
type of groups harmed in order to supplement the Convention’s vacant protections. Therefore, 
we may have to see from domestic adaptations and different examples of the Convention applies 
                                                          
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
3 William Schabas has called the genocide crime as the crime of crimes in his book. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2009). 
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in our perception, that its’ article II of the Convention does not necessarily protect the ‘right’ 
people. 
But it is time to consider what the British prosecutor in prosecuting Nazi war criminals at 
Nuremberg Trial tried to imply when he was making a closing statement that “genocidal 
technique varied in different forms, but the aim was the same in all cases.” 4 It is important to 
recall this statement today in order to address the atrocities occurring in the North Korean 
political camps because even though the Convention does not generally protect political groups 
in genocidal offenses, the essential grounds for massive persecution are same in the present case. 
Some people are targeted and eradicated for being sent to one of the political camps. The 
procedure for the classification of political purges is in fact a process of stigmatization of citizens 
on political grounds. So one may ask some questions: what if the political faith has become the 
identity of the people and stigmatized them for their lifetime, in a manner that is unchangeable, 
similar to race or nationality? what if there is no racial or ethnic difference among the people 
except only political identification? These questions must be counted into the Korean contexts 
when defining what ‘political’ means in order to inquiry human rights violations in the North 
Korean political camps. Korea has been a nation-state for centuries until the Korean War divided 
the Northern part as Communist state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK” 
hereinafter), and Southern part as democratic state, the Republic of Korea. In fact, there have 
been genocide incidents against innocent citizens, which could be framed as severe persecutions 
on different political beliefs based on the ideological polarization, but none of them has received 
proper analysis in genocide contexts. 
                                                          
4 Goring [IMT 1946] 19 IMT Proceeding 1, 497 (British prosecutor). 
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It is also essential to note the fact that political group’s protection was once in the first 
draft of the Convention but disappeared at some point of the discussions in terms of protecting 
political groups in genocide crimes. No records provided the reason behind the sudden exclusion, 
but the Soviet Union delegate submitted a document that explicitly lacked political groups in the 
enumeration.5 To one’s surprise, the Soviet Union’s intention was reflected in the Convention’s 
final draft and is still preserved by its own text, excluding challenges for different possible 
groupness.  
This thesis aims, therefore, to provide an idea because genocide has strong power to open 
the gate for more approaches in the North Korean atrocities while the state tries to remain 
exclusive and silent. The North Korean political camps are built on the intention of mass 
destruction, as a method to eradicate the existence of political opponents including their family 
members by implementing the involvement system. The North Korean involvement system was 
made by Kim Il-sung’s personal policy that national enemies must be eradicated for three 
generations of their family. In short, the camp system including on-going operation contains the 
essential elements to establish a genocide crime, although they still cannot constitute a genocide 
crime because of exclusion of political group in interpreting the Convention’s enumeration. In 
this regard, the Genocide Convention should be reread to include this group of people in order to 
provoke faster and more tangible solution to resolve this situation as concerned about the similar 
atrocities that are happening today’ world and might happen in the future.  
This thesis will first demonstrate the current situations of the political camps based on 
official reports made by international or national authorities in order to give a glimpse of the 
                                                          
5 Economic and Social Council, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide submitted the Delegate of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.N. Doc. E/AC. 25/7 (Apr. 7, 1948). 
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shadow in the state’s hidden sites. Secondly, it will introduce the drafting history of how the 
Convention was drafted, to contemplate the reason behind sudden disappearance of ‘political 
group’ in the final draft. Next, it will demonstrate the applications of the Genocide Convention 
when a political group is targeted and destroyed. International courts strictly respect the words in 
the Convention so there has been no case that protected a political group. But the next part 
explores the reason why the courts’ norm should be challenged again to address the North 
Korean political camps because the gathered in the camps share some similar characters to 
national, racial or religious groups. This thesis will ultimately recommend solutions for broader 
application of the term, ‘genocide’ at the end.  
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CHAPTER I. POLITICAL CAMPS IN THE DPRK 
The political camp is the most devastating and secret place to destroy human dignity in 
the DPRK as one renamed the sites as “hidden gulags of the DPRK.”6 The political camps, or 
“Kwan-li so” in its own language, however, cannot be found if one reads thoroughly the DPRK’s 
policies or laws.7 Unlike the state’s labor camps, which are also called as “reeducation camps”, 
neither the legislation or judicial authority in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(“DPRK” hereinafter) recognizes the existence of the political camps.8 According to the findings 
of the United Nations’ report on human rights in the DPRK (“UN DPRK report” hereinafter) 
political camps are disguised as military camps or agricultural facilities and the Bureau No. 7, 
the authority to manage the camps, is known as a “farming bureau” to public.9 The state has 
consistently insisted every report revealing human rights violations in the state, including the 
hidden political camps, is fabricated and compromised by international agencies, when human 
                                                          
6 DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF “THOSE WHO ARE SENT TO THE MOUNTAINS” 
(2012). 
7 Political camps have different names such as political prisons or concentration camps when translated in different 
languages. This thesis only uses the term political camps to indicate the “Kwan-li-so” in the DPRK system, in order 
to distinguish the legal imprisonment which is provided by the DPRK’s judicial process. The detained in the camps 
are different from modern meaning of the prisoners due to the unique characteristic of the political persecution in the 
DPRK, and also the difference between the camp system and regular prison system. 
8 DPRK law has the term “labor camps” in the provision. Article 30 of criminal law says, “Lifetime and limited term 
of reform through labor shall be executed by sending an offender to a long-term prison labor camp where he or she 
will engage in labor.” Hyongbeob [Criminal Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea], amended and 
supplemented by Decree No. 2387 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly on May 14, 2012, art. 30 (N. 
Kor.), translated by Amanda Won in Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (emphasis added). DPRK also 
developed a different model of concentration camp besides political camps. The labor camps are less known to 
world and barely investigated by other agencies when the DPRK human rights issues arise. This thesis does not 
consider labor camps as another type of political camp because the inmates are detained for minor offence, not for 
political reasons, and released soon compared to those serving in the political camps for their lifetime. However, 
these camps must receive further investigations in order to identify human rights abuses in DPRK regarding the 
severe conditions similar to the political camps. See ASAN REPORT, HUMAN RIGHT SITUATIONS IN NORTH KOREAN 
REEDUCATION CAMPS (2017).  
9 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the DPRK, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, ¶221, (Feb. 7, 
2014). 
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right abuses in the political camps have received the worldwide attentions after a number of the 
DPRK defectors testified to reveal the grave inflicts in the camps.10 
 
1. History of the DPRK political camps 
The establishment of the political camps was the state leader’s strategy to stabilize his 
political grounds in the authoritarian state. Concentration camps, which are original models of 
the DPRK’s political camps, have functioned as a tool in different forms to stabilize the political 
power throughout the human history and DPRK adopted the Soviet Gulag system, which was 
designed and developed the serve Stalin’s political achievements, as one of the Communist 
allies.11 The DPRK political camps have become another example of the most destructive 
institutes to conduct massive scale persecutions. 
Kim Il-sung, the first leader of the Kim’s regime, secretly established political camps in 
order to solidify his political grounds over the state in 1950s.12 Mr. Hwang, the former secretary 
of the Workers’ Party in the DPRK, testified the first camp was built as a control zone near a 
mining area in Pyeong-an Nam do, following Kim’s internal policy in 1958, after the August 
Jongpa Case.13 Most of Kim’s primary political enemies were first executed, then their families 
                                                          
10 Most of the inquiries to human right violations in the DPRK have been challenged by the methods of work and 
heavily relied on the defectors’ testimonies due to the limited access into the state. For instance, the UN DPRK 
report said “in the absence of access to witnesses and sites inside the DPRK, the Commission decided to obtain first-
hand testimony through public hearings that observed transparency, due process and the protection of victims and 
witnesses. Victims and witnesses who had departed the DPRK, as well as experts, testified in a transparent 
procedure that was open to the media, other observers and members of the general public.” Rep. of the Detailed 
Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK), Supra 
¶30. 
11 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra ¶743. 
12 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra ¶227. 
13 KOREAN BAR ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2018, 365 (2018). Several party 
members who opposed Kim Il-sung’s political line and insisted different Socialism approach were purged between 
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and other potential threats to his power were sent to the camp sites. The camps became subject to 
armed surveillance as Kim ordered to prevent and suppress any possible future rebellions after 
the August Jongpa while growing to detain any other opponents to the DPRK’s only party during 
1970s, and later, to the successor Kim Jong-il, during 1980s.14 
The camps still function to repress any different political ideas to Kim’s own-defined 
Socialist regime and prevent the nationals from developing their own political ideas against the 
state. Additionally, the camps are provoking great fears among the citizens as the camp system 
does not have legal grounds to operate but on arbitrary basis which can be rewritten by the 
officials. The DPRK government, of course, has not mentioned related information to confirm 
the existence and implementation of the camps in any of the government-issued publications. 
Only the defectors, who managed to arrive in other states, brought out the existence of the camps 
at first. Therefore, the current locations are presumably estimated mostly based on the defectors’ 
testimonies, without the state’s specific confirmation. 
 
2. Current situations of the political camps 
It is in fact impossible to conduct a field investigation on the political camp sites. 
However, the findings of the official reports written by the United Nations, United States 
government and South Korean Institute help demonstrate general conditions over the camps. UN 
DPRK report clarified the commission’s standard of proof is lower than one required in normal 
                                                          
June and August in 1956. Kim Il-sung eventually founded a solid system to strengthen his sole leadership after this 
case. 
14 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra. 
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legal proceedings, reasonable grounds.15 Most of testimonies are made by the North Korean 
defectors who hated and fled from the country, therefore, it is not expected to meet the normal 
standard in procedure for evidence. 
2.1. Current locations of the camps 
Due to the state’s exclusiveness, however, several obstacles often appear to discourage 
inquires which aim to review the state’s reaction is convincing or not. In addition, it is even 
impossible to locate the current sites of the existing political camps on the map. United States 
Department of State detected 6 camps in 2017 based on the satellite images and reported in 
assumption that several prisoners have been transferred to different locations while some of them 
are missing.16 Korea Institute of National Unification has different finding in 2018 that only 5 
camps are still in operation.17 In 2013 the institute made a calculation to assume that at least 
8,000 or at most 12,000 inmates were detained in entire camps, but did not provide the estimated 
current number of the detained, due to the frequent changes of the regime’s policy and stricter 
internal security.18 This unpredictable change in the regime’s policy is one of the main factors 
that strengthens the role of the political camps in maintaining the power and provoking the fear 
among the people under the regime. 
Several attempts have been made to affirm the existence of the camps but failed to 
provide a conclusion on the exact locations of the political camps. In 2014, the UN DPRK report 
concluded that the state used to have about 12 camps in the first period of establishing the state 
                                                          
15 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra ¶68. “…when it has obtained a reliable body of information, consistent with other material, 
based on which a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person has reason to believe that such incident or patter of 
conduct has occurred.” 
16 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PRISONS OF NORTH KOREA (2017), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/273647.htm 
17 KOREA INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2018 (2018). 
18 Id. 
10 
 
and now only 4 of them are still under operation. The report did not exclude the possibility of 
other existing camps but was only able to roughly assume the situation in the four camps. The 4 
camps are Camp 14 Kaechoen, Camp 15 Yodok, Camp 16 Myong-gan, and Camp 25 Chengjn. It 
has been known that the camps have 2 different zones, a total control zone and a revolutionary 
zone. Only Camp 15 Yodok seems to have both zones in the sites. The report also assumed that 
Camp 14, 15, and 16 are under State Security Department’s control. Social Security Agency, 
which was used to be Ministry of Peoples’ Security, is currently in charge of overall 
management of the camps and still follows the Party’s decision.19  
The United States Department of State produced a different finding. The Department 
detected 6 camps based on the satellite image analysis over the DPRK territory in 2017; Camp 
14 Kaechon, Camp 25 Chongjin, Camp 16 Hwasong, Camp 22 Hoeryong (2012), Camp 18 
Pukchang and Camp 15 Yodok.20 According to the Department’s report, the detained are not 
allocated to stay in one camp and have to leave the initial camp and wander throughout the 
different sites. The Department assumed the detained in the Camp 22 are transferred to Camp 16 
and some of them disappeared.21 
More recent source is provided by Korea Institute of National Unification (“KINU” 
hereinafter). KINU published an annual 2018 report, finding 5 camps are existing in the state. It 
concluded Camp 14 Kaechon, Camp 14 Yodok, Camp 16 Myeong-gan, Camp 18 Kaechon and 
Camp 25 Cheongjin are still under operation based on a testimony that Camp 22 Hoeryong is 
currently padlocked. Earlier in 2017, KINU also found that the supporters and relatives of Lee 
                                                          
19 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra ¶223. 
20 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Supra. 
21 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Supra. 
11 
 
Yeong-ho and Jang Sung-taek, previous party members who were executed in 2013, were 
detained in the camps as well.22 Lee and Jang were in high positions in the Worker’s Party of 
Korea and Jang was Kim Jong-un’s uncle, one of the great supporters of Kim’s political debut. 
2.2. Current situations of the inmates 
The current status of the detained are highly vulnerable. They were not provided any 
legal right from the stage of the arrest. No law describes the process in arresting the accused and 
sending them to the political camp. In short, no legal procedures are guaranteed during the entire 
process. Once accused, the suspect is directly sent to the camps without an opportunity to 
counsel or even defend oneself in the courts and segregated from the society upon the arrival, 
losing the ordinary citizenry. The sudden apprehension thus results in suspicious disappearances 
in the state and assists in building a solid threatful system among the people. KINU reported in 
2018 that some apprehensions are made because of the religious beliefs, for instance, a citizen 
was sent to and detained in a camp when the bible was found at home.23 
The detained have to face more risks from the moment they arrived the camp sites. Camp 
guards sometimes receive rewards for catching the fugitive with their guns, furthermore, never 
become subject to penalties when they eventually or mistakenly kill one of the inmates. It can be 
said the entire process for the camp system works without a judicial review or oversight. The 
punishments given to the detained are not provided by legal basis and range from severe labor 
which exceeds the normal amount a person can handle a day, to physical violence sometimes 
leading to death. The forced labor is another fatal factor that increases the number of the death in 
the camps. When an inmate fails to meet the daily quota of his work, even without a day off in 
                                                          
22 KINU, Supra. 
23 KINU, Supra 370. 
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weeks, he gets severely beaten by the camp guards. Tortures are unexceptionally conducted 
among the camps, often even in the interrogation process, without explanations. Sometimes 
children are forced to watch the entire torture process.24 
General basic human rights cannot be guaranteed as well over the camp sites. Separate 
rooms are given to divide males and females as marriage and family rights are prohibited. A 
family cannot live together and a couple should divorce when a spouse is sent to the camp in 
order to avoid the broad application of involvement system.25 Inmates cannot be sexually 
engaged but sometimes female inmates become pregnant because they are raped by camp guards 
and no public record reported such cases. A testimony in the UN DPRK report described 
executions and tortures were followed when the woman was forced to have an abortion and even 
watch the babies killed at birth.26 
In the conclusion of the UN DPRK report, there are cases of lack of food supply, 
excessive forced labor, dangerous diseases, arbitrary execution, rapes, murder and other 
persecutions in the DPRK political camps. The inquiry commission concluded crimes against 
                                                          
24 Shin Dong-hyuk, who managed to successfully arrive South Korea in 2006 after three attempts, was born and 
grew up in the Kaecheon political camp until he decided to escape the camp in 2005. His interviews and book 
revealed the wretched life of the prisoners in political camps including his personal stories. His book was published 
in English. See SHIN DONG-HYUK, ESCAPE FROM CAMP 14 (2012). A short review also introduced him that he was 
born in one of the political camps in the DPRK and raised while competing with his family members for foods. The 
most shocking story of Shin is that he reported to a camp guard that his mother and brother were planning to escape 
then he was forced to watch their public execution. This extreme story immediately gained humanitarian concerns 
from all over the world. When the review quoted a previous camp guard’s words that “the theory behind the camps 
was to cleanse unto three generations the families of incorrect thinkers.”, it demonstrated the intention camp system 
is built on was to eradicate a class of people and the consequence is the inmates become inhumane and worse than 
being hopeless. They eventually become to never consider even suicide. It was evident that Shin suffered mental 
disease as a result of lifetime brainwashing when he arrived another country. But Mr. Shin showed a glimpse of 
hope since Shin could recover from his nightmare memories and now works as a human right advocate for the North 
Korea. Carl Gershman, A Voice from the North Korean Gulag, 24 J. OF DEMOCRACY 165, 168 (2013). 
25 KINU, Supra 373. 
26 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra.¶764 
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humanity have been committed throughout the camps but did not discuss the application of 
genocide crime.27  
2.3. Classification of the inmates 
The detained are officially called as “li-joo-min”, a Korean word to indicate people who 
cannot settle down in a permanent residence and wander around for a long period of time. The 
renaming of the detained implies that they deprive of ordinary citizenry, often for life time, and 
are never able to live in a certain place. They are classified as “class enemies” , in fact, 
considered to be threats to the national security and the regimes’ great policy to stabilize the 
peoples’ wealth and national prosperity. As the camps’ size and locations have changed, the 
inmates consist of not only the collaborators under Japanese invasion, private property owners 
but also defectors and some religious leaders. These changes were developed with an 
involvement system, “yeon-jwa-je”, which is to imprison up to three generations of the accused. 
The involvement system was also developed with accords to Kim’s policies that the class 
enemies must be eradicated through three generations. 
Korean Bar Association provided statistics about the names of charges of the detained in 
the camps. The involvement system itself was the first reason that led to the detention as 29% of 
the inmates were detained under the charge of involvement system.28 10.5% were those who 
once tried to flee to South Korea and other 4.9% were religious activists.29 Other charges 
included secret divulgence, treasury, and criticizing the regime. Moreover, 70% of the detained 
were families and relatives of ‘original’ inmates.30 Implementation of the involvement system is 
                                                          
27 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Supra ¶1158. 
28 KOREAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2018, 366 (2018). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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the core foundation to sustain the threatening institutes, that is, constitutes a certain vulnerable 
group in the society. 
  
15 
 
CHAPTER II. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
 The atrocities occurring in the DPRK political camps reasonably seem likely they could 
meet the definition of genocide, however, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of the Genocide (“the Convention” hereinafter) does not allow the brutal offences to 
receive the title. The Convention, which once was intentionally drafted to protect the political 
group from the genocide crimes, expressed more narrow concerns in preserving the existence of 
certain groups by enumerating only four groups could be targeted in genocidal intents. When a 
brilliant lawyer invented the term as a memorial to prevent future tragedies, he wished to protect 
any vulnerable groups that might encounter destructive discriminations in enormous scales. 
Although he did not anticipate a political group could be perpetrated due to the groupness for 
certain grounds, the interpreters of the Convention should be reminded that the detainees in the 
DPRK political camps are one of the most vulnerable targeted groups, which needs the 
Convention’s great protections.  
 
1. The origin of the term 
It has not been a century since the term genocide was coined. A Polish lawyer and 
professor Raphael Lemkin, who had to escape from Nazi government and arrived the United 
States, was the inventor of the term, combining Greek word genos (race, tribe) and Latin cide 
(killing).31 He was first to introduce legal concept to explain atrocities occurring throughout 
human history with the new term. It was an astonishing invention and discovery. He 
distinguished the crime of genocide from a mere conduct of killing in a massive scale, which is 
often conducted by a state, and cemented the objective of genocidal acts among different state 
                                                          
31 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, 
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crucial acts in order to provide legal meaning for the term.32 His idea accordingly provided the 
core element of the crime by requiring the acts must accompany a certain plan to destroy the 
fundamental foundations of a group while the plan aims to exterminate the entire members of the 
group.  
In addition to the invention of the term, Lemkin provided that genocidal acts include 
various acts rather than killing members of a certain group. He adopted a broader view to 
account characters of such acts than what is today generally accepted.33 This view included 
political, economic and cultural genocide. Depriving of political rights would eventually result in 
extermination of a national or racial group as well as economic genocide. According to his 
definition, any act that deliberately leads to annihilation of a group would be named as 
genocide.34 However, note genocidal acts which Lemkin described in his work do not imply the 
protection of political groups and actually have different meaning from genocide against political 
groups. It is undeniable true that he provided a wide scope of acts to terminate the living 
condition of a special group to explain the concept of genocide, however, he did not count a 
political group as one of the groups that may become extinct as a result of the persecution and 
need protection.35 Nazi’s denationalization of Jews and others who did not have any connection 
to German root were mainly vulnerable due to their nationality and race. It is true that Nazi 
                                                          
32 Supra. 
33 Supra.  
34 Supra. 
35 William Schabas, Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 375, 386 (2000). “In his 
famous study, he associated the prohibition of genocide with the protection of minorities. Lemkin clearly 
did not intend the prohibition of genocide to cover all minorities, but rather those that had been 
contemplated by the minorities treaties of the inter-war years. The term "national" had an already well-
accepted technical meaning, having been used to describe minorities in the legal regime established in the 
aftermath of the First World War. For Lemkin, genocide was above all meant to describe the destruction 
of the Jews, who cannot in a strict sense be termed a national group at all.” 
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regime persecuted other political parties in the nation, however, it was not perceived as severe 
violation as “final solution” to Jews.36  
A remarkable feature of Lemkin’s first framework is, nevertheless, his invention 
suggested an insightful point for further discussions for broadening the scope of the protection in 
genocide crimes. His endeavor has preserved in the works for broader range of acts that could be 
defined as genocide regardless of the character of the act and addition of more groups to the 
protection. His ultimate point that when a group of people are left vulnerable by the harms which 
devastated their life and destiny of the group, there should be a prevention as well as protection. 
He appealed to establish a legal frame both in international and domestic legislation in order to 
prevent and punish the genocide crimes that might happen in the same scale in the future, 
contributing in imposing international norm against the crime.37 
 
2. Drafting a convention on genocide 
Provoked by the awareness of the tragedies occurring under the Nazi government’s 
occupation, the International Military Tribunal was established in Nuremberg following the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal and the previous main Nazi leaders were tried in 
the court.38 They were first prosecuted for extermination of the Jewish people and other nationals 
in their occupied regions, however, the judges refused to consider the genocide charge although 
it was the first time the term genocide appeared in court. The Tribunal instead rendered decisions 
of crimes against humanity, establishing war-time nexus to the crime.39 Since the trial, the 
                                                          
36 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Supra. 
37 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Supra 90-95. 
38 William Schabas, Origin of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 35, 
41-46 (2007). 
39 This decision, of course, did not satisfy Lemkin. A former Nuremberg prosecutor Henry T. King, Jr. remembered 
the first meeting with Lemkin as “Lemkin was very upset. He was concerned that the decision of the International 
Military Tribunal—the Nuremberg Court—did not go far enough in dealing with genocidal actions. This was 
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genocide crime and the crime against humanity have become overlapped throughout the 
development of the international criminal law. 
The Nuremberg Trial then created Nuremberg Principles in the United Nation General 
Assembly Resolution 95(I).40 The Resolution tended to adopt crimes against humanity as 
Nuremberg legacy rather than genocide.41 In addition to the Resolution 95(1), the General 
Assembly made Resolution 96(I) on the same day to devise a legal norm to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide.42 The Resolution 96(I) did not use crime against humanity in the text and 
during the discussion several attempts were made to reveal a clear relationship between the 
genocide crime and crimes against humanity. 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was then assigned to prepare the drafting 
the Convention following the Resolution 96(I). ECOSOC did not consider the Secretary-
General’s suggestion to refer the Commission on Human Rights or a special committee of the 
Council.43 The Secretariat at the same time prepared to draft the Convention with prominent 
experts including Raphael Lemkin. France insisted genocide to be incorporated as the most 
serious type of crime against humanity by distributing a memorandum of its own definition and 
refused to use the term in a distinct way. But this argument did not receive enough supports 
because others agreed to use genocide term separately from broad translation of crime against 
humanity. 
The General Assembly next regular session was held in 1947 to discuss the texts in the 
draft. The United Kingdom hesitated to adopt the radical term of genocide and suggested the 
                                                          
because the IMT limited its judgment to wartime genocide and did not include peacetime genocide.” Henry T. Jr. 
King; Benjamin B. Ferencz; Whitney R. Harris, Origins of the Genocide Convention, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 
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40 G.A. Res. 95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
41 William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention – From Nuremberg to Paris, Supra 37 (2007). 
42 G.A. Res. 96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
43 William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention – From Nuremberg to Paris Supra. 
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International Law Commission review the confusion between the two crimes. However, Cuba, 
India and Panama instituted the discussion on the agenda and proceeded to negotiations. Panama, 
Cuba, Egypt and China consistently appealed to draw a clear line between the Nuremberg 
Charter and the Genocide Convention. The ECOSOC then sent the draft to an Ad Hoc 
Committee to review the Secretariat draft.44 The final draft was prepared by the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly in 1948.  
While polishing the words in the draft, there was an evident change between the first and 
final draft regarding the Convention’s protection. The first draft of Resolution 96(I) mentioned 
“national, racial, ethnical or religious groups” as to protected groups in the Convention, while the 
final version drafted by the Sixth Committee stated “racial, religious, political and other 
groups.”45 No official record explained the sudden addition in the draft.46  
General Assembly Resolution 96(I) led to creation of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 and later drafts of the Convention included 
racial, religious, political and other groups. The Resolution was adopted without any debate and 
unanimously. It was to accord to the historical precedent, Nuremberg Charter article 6(c) which 
provided specific definition of crimes against humanity such as persecution on political, racial, 
or religious grounds.47 The line between crimes of humanity and genocide crime has been 
blurred. The French delegate affirmatively held its position in arguing that genocide was a sub-
                                                          
44 William A. Schabas, Origins of the Genocide Convention – From Nuremberg to Paris, Supra 38-39. 
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category of crimes against humanity. But others conceived the importance of genocide in 
international law so that the crime could be punished under universal jurisdiction.  
The drafting history of the Convention clearly shows the drafters’ intention to include 
political groups in the Convention. However, the two words ‘political group’ disappeared when 
the Convention was ratified. The exclusion of specific groups in the enumeration provoked 
several controversies after the Convention was ratified and the draft has faced large challenges to 
retain its first texts. One of main controversies was to decide the jurisdiction to prosecute the 
international crime. Since the states’ sovereignty were absolute and preserved within the 
territory, most states were hostile to a situation where the power was restricted by universal 
jurisdiction. In this regard, such discussions were more like trades between the proponents of the 
original draft and opponents who were frustrated by the establishment universal jurisdiction. 
Hence in order to encourage more states’ participation, the last draft was designed to include the 
least essential elements which were frequently mentioned in the first draft of the Convention. As 
a result, the final draft abandoned the ‘political group’ with other groups and was finally ratified. 
 
3. Exclusion of political group 
The Convention still requires evolving interpretations and indirect route to achieve its 
goal because of  the “blind spots” embodied in itself.48 While additions of other groups to the 
enumerated protected groups encountered frustrations in reaching an agreement, ‘political group’ 
has brought the most controversial debates in applying genocide terms because its exclusion has 
raised several questions of the effectiveness of the protection, since the Convention was 
officially signed by the states. The strongest arguments made by the opponents to the inclusion is 
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the political group lacked stability to receive the Convention’s protection and implied an 
ambiguous concept to attribute to the protected groups. One of the powerful opponents during 
the drafting process was the Soviet Union, strongly asserting the exclusion of political groups 
because if the Convention had protected political groups, the mechanism of genocide would have 
highly likely lose the scientific basis in explaining such situations with legal grounds and the 
Convention accordingly would lack utility in providing protections as an international 
convention. But it is presumed the Convention would provide chances for other states to 
intervene if such group were protected. The Soviet Union delegate did not express such reasons 
in the document. Compared to the previous U.N. resolution which explicitly mentioned 
“political” in the Convention’s protected groups, however, it was unexpected that the Soviet 
Union’s document omitted the word “political” in the groups while suggesting basic principles in 
drafting the Convention.49 In the first paragraph, it used the word “theories” saying the genocide 
was conducted under Fascism, Nazism and other similar race “theories”. This would be the first 
evidence for the exclusion because there was no theory for protecting political groups when the 
Convention was drafted. Additionally, it was obvious that the Soviet delegate emphasized the 
category of race and nationality (or religion) in defining the term genocide.50 One point that 
Soviet uniquely made in the document was to include cultural genocide. It boarded the scope of 
the concept beyond the physical destruction of racial or national groups, insisting acts which 
destroy the national language or culture should be considered as genocidal acts. Except the 
omission of the political groups, it seemed to adopt a broader definition of the term.51 It also 
seemed to strengthen the power of domestic legislation and courts in punishing the crime rather 
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than more relying on international cooperation.52 No clear evidence other than the Soviet 
delegate’s reasoning was found in the official records which identified specific grounds for 
removing some vulnerable groups.  
Advocates who have insisted to include political group and others argue that the 
exclusion was a merely political compromise or trade rather than a theoretically grounded 
decision.53 No legal grounds supported in imposing limitations to the protected groups, 
considering the drafts of the Convention explicitly intended to protect a diversity of the groups. 
Also regarding the timing when the Convention was drafted, a plausible explanation of the 
exclusion entailed there would have been political trades to encourage Soviet and other 
Communist states’ participation, who were not willing to confine themselves to possible 
penalties followed by the Convention in the near future.54 When the Convention was drafted, for 
example, Joseph Starlin had already operated the gulag system to detain political opponents so 
the Soviet Union might have to provide plausible explanations when accused of genocide 
charges. But some delegates at the drafting discussions specifically agreed to include political 
groups to the protected groups, pointing out political group had similar characters like 
permanency of the membership, therefore, the groups would be likely to pass the Convention’s 
threshold in deciding to render the protections to a minority or a group.55 With a glimpse of 
upcoming Cold War, they were even able to predict there would be more serious persecutions 
based on different ideologies and destroying one’s faith.56  On the other hand, some advocates to 
have agreed extension of the Convention’s protection and criticized political trades behind the 
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final draft because the international convention standing for the most vulnerable human lives 
were the mere reflection of the compromises.57 
  
                                                          
57 Beth Van Schaack, Supra. 
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CHAPTER III. GENOCIDE AND GENOCIDE CRIME 
 The drafters failed to predict that the exclusion of certain groups, including political 
groups and unfinished debates over the intended enumeration would gradually create difficulties 
for the Convention’s role in real genocidal atrocities. They were not able to see that political 
concentration camp would appear to conduct the same or even worse harms in the DPRK. As a 
result, to deal with the mass destructions which cannot receive the Genocide Convention’s 
protection, the international courts and some states have developed their own strategies to rescue 
the victims who are left vulnerable to grave crimes. Such a gap provoked confusion between the 
public understanding of genocide and legal framing in establishing a genocide crime. While the 
international courts strictly adhere to original texts and avoid to extend the scope of definition, 
which may weaken the application of the norm, protecting political groups from genocidal harms 
is one of the famous challenges made by advocates with different approaches in order to achieve 
the ultimate goal of the Convention. 
 
1. Inherent limitations of the Convention due to the exclusion of political group 
The omission of “political group” in the drafting history of the Convention could be then 
summarized by the Polish delegate’s statement that “genocide was basically a crime committed 
against a group of people who had certain stable and characteristic features in common.”58  
Moreover, the Brazilian delegate insisted that political genocide was rarely conceived in a Latin 
American context.59 But others saw the upcoming glimpse of extreme divisions of political 
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ideology, as the Haiti delegate predicted that political groups would face more serious threats 
than other groups in the Convention when arguing over the exclusion of the political groups: 
 
“One must look further, and realize that strife between nations had now been 
superseded by strife between ideologies. Men no longer destroyed for reasons of 
national, racial or religious hatred, but in the name of ideas and the faith to which they 
gave birth. A majority Government had nothing to fear from the inclusion of political 
groups among the groups to be protected by the convention. It was when the majority 
of the people was opposed to the ideology of the Government that there was a danger 
of the minority using force to hold the majority in check. The notion of an attack on 
internal security of a State was very vague, and any act could be presented as an attack 
of that nature. The future convention should therefor contain an enumeration of all 
crimes against basic human liberties, as defined in the Charter of the United Nations. 
If the Committee wished to do useful work, it must make the concept of genocide 
cover crimes committed against political groups.”60  
 
Nonetheless, no further amendment was made to the Convention’s language and the consequences 
of the exclusion have been far beyond the drafters’ original expectation in terms of preventing 
annihilation of other excluded groups, specifically the political group. 
The narrow scope of interpretation, therefore, has confused both public awareness and 
international lawyers as to where the legal term cannot fit into the facts and has raised the basic 
question to the capability of the Convention: how can the genocide against political groups be 
punished? David Hawk and Hurst Hannum presented a related memorandum to International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Pol Pot, the leader of the previous Khmer Rouge regime of 
Cambodia, of murdering the nationals who opposed the regime’s policy.61 The memorandum did 
not explicitly cover the possibility of applying the genocide against political groups or political 
genocide, but built its own claim based on the fact that political context was one of the factors of 
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the persecution, in framing genocide crime against national groups.62 As political context arose 
explaining the reason for harsh persecution in massive scales, several advocates have challenged 
the current international norms. 
1.1. Domestic prosecution in genocide against political groups 
France is a great example of a state with domestic penal code which provides broader 
scope to cover genocide crimes in light of the Convention’s strict definition. In Article 211-1 of 
French Penal Code, the range of protected groups could be broadened with more flexible criteria 
than the Convention’s enumerated groups as the article provides: 
 
“Genocide occurs when, in the enforcement of a concerted plan aimed at the partial 
or total destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or of a group determined 
by any other arbitrary criterion, one of the following actions are committed or caused to be 
committed against members of that group:…” (emphasis added.)63  
 
The code does not explicitly mention “political group” in its enumeration, however, any 
group distinguished “by other arbitrary criterion” can be protected with interpretations. 
According to the French definition, therefore, the crime could be committed against political 
groups and such persecutors could be sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in French courts.64 
Some states have also developed their own procedures to protect political groups from 
the crime of genocide. For example, Ethiopia established a case prosecuting and punishing 
criminals who committed genocide against political groups. In SPO v. Colonel Mengistu 
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Hailemariam et al. (1994-2008), the First Division Criminal Bench of the Federal High Court 
found the defendants, the political leaders of the previous regime, accountable for committing 
genocide against political groups.65 The decision was supported by Ethiopian legislature which 
reserved the French legacy to prosecute a broader range of genocide criminals than the 
Convention provided.  
A.  Special Prosecutor v. Colonel Hailemariam in Ethiopian court 
Ethiopia successfully established legislation to provide broader definition of the genocide 
crime like France as well as a court decision to prosecute and punish those who committed 
genocide against political groups as a transitional justice process for the previous regime. When 
the former Derg government was overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), the EPRDF provided the legal basis to prosecute the previous Derg officials for 
committing genocide by targeting the vulnerable political groups who opposed the Derg regime 
during 1974-1991 and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia eventually instituted Special 
Prosecutor Officer (SPO) for prosecutions.66  
In SPO v. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al. (1994-2008), the Federal High Court, 
First Division Criminal Bench, convicted the defendants for genocide in Ethiopian jurisdiction 
even though the Genocide Convention does not protect political groups.67 Before the indictment, 
“political group” was listed as one of the protected groups for genocide crime in the article 281 
of 1957 Penal Code as it provide: “Whosever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group, organizes, order or engages in, be it in time 
                                                          
65 Federal High Court Jan. 11, 2009, Special Prosecutor v Colonel Hailemariam (Mengistu) (Eth.). 
66 Girmachew Aneme, The Anatomy of Special Prosecutor v. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al. (1994-2008) 4 
INT’L J. OF ETHIOPIAN STUD. 1 (2009). 
67 Original full text preliminary decision is available at Oxford Public International Law 
(http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ildc/555et95.case.1/law-ildc-555et95-555(ET1995)J.pdf.). 
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of war or in time of peace: (emphasis added).”68 The case has provided clear answers to some 
major questions or issues in protecting political groups in genocide crimes. First, when the 
defendants claimed sovereign immunity for holding high positions in the previous government, 
SPO explained that even a head of a state could be punished by law and it was accepted by the 
Court.69 Secondly, defendants tried to dismiss the genocide charge because international law did 
not punish genocidal criminals in attacking political groups and the Convention also did not 
protect political group. SPO did not rebut the exclusion of the Convention but confirmed the 
existence of the domestic legal basis for punishing genocide crime which implemented broader 
protections for more groups than international convention, as a French legacy in the Code.70 The 
Court did not exclude such argument and finally convicted the defendants of genocide against 
political group, strongly establishing the first precedent in its national justice system. 
1.2. International understanding on genocide against political groups 
Van Shaack was one of the eminent pioneers to capture the “blind spots” of the 
Convention in discussing the genocidal atrocities which occurred during the previous Khmer 
regime of Cambodia.71 Although the Convention did not protect the groups persecuted, the 
broader inclusion would be provided by customary international law, which was not fully 
reflected in the Convention’s languages. She argued that the genocide is prohibited as jus cogens 
of customary international law under universal jurisdiction, although the Convention limited 
itself to the territorial jurisdiction.72 In this regard, public international law is not contrary to 
domestic penal codes, which disapproves of individual wrongful activities even sometimes 
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beyond the borders.73 Therefore, customary international law has priority in possibly addressing 
the issues hidden in the “blind spots” of the Convention.74  
Her claim faced the following questions to acquire comprehensive consensus in building 
a solid foundation. For instance, in discussing the broader application of customary international 
law for genocide crimes, Bettwy suggested it would be far more difficult than her expectation for 
the courts to recognize the existence of customary international law in order to address the 
consequences of excluding “political group.”75 Bettwy did not agree, furthermore, that the 
groups excluded by the Convention itself would be instead protected by the customary 
international law since the Convention made the enumeration in the Article II exhaustive and the 
courts have respected the intention.76 Customary international law cannot be, therefore, a cure-all 
for the Convention’s lack of protection. It is difficult for the courts to solely implement the 
custom when the ratified agreement stands for the opposite direction. There is no case law or 
precedent established by international courts to find concrete basis for customary international 
law to instead provide protections to political groups, even though the courts often find the 
genocide crime is prohibited by the corresponding customary international law. The courts have 
strictly preserved the Convention’s definition and rendered decisions applying the Convention 
first. 
When the charges of committing genocide against political groups are present at 
international court, therefore, the claims are highly likely to be dismissed in the preliminary 
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procedure because they are not ‘genocide crimes’ according to the Convention’s definition. At 
the same time the courts often find genocide is one of the international crimes prohibited by 
customary international law before the Convention was ratified, but the charges then are made as 
crimes against humanity, which have a broad scope of application to cover any inflictions on 
individuals or groups regardless of the grounds of the attack. Political genocide or genocide 
against political groups thus are prosecuted as crimes against humanity in international courts. 
A. Customary international law and genocide crimes 
In addition to international human right treaties or conventions’ significant roles in 
implementing protections, customary international law is another source of law to protect human 
rights. It is therefore often argued that customary international law provides protections to the 
excluded groups of the Genocide Convention because the Convention reflects the existing 
customary international law. Before drafting the Convention, General Assembly affirmed that 
genocide is against international law and declared it as an international crime.77 The languages 
used in the resolutions suggest that genocide was already a crime prohibited by international law 
and drafting a convention was a codification of an existing customary international law. 
Moreover, this can be found in the most recent genocide case decided by the Extraordinary 
Chamber of the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC” hereinafter). The Chamber again found genocide 
is a crime under customary international law.78 This consistent logic that customary international 
law also prohibits the genocide crime found in the courts’ decisions then led to more challenges 
                                                          
77 G.A. Res. 96(I), at 189 (Dec. 11, 1946); G.A. Res. 180(II) at 129 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
78 Case 002/02, Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, ¶788 (2018). Despite the longstanding 
debates over the possibilities of framing genocide crime against political groups, the Chamber concluded that the 
genocide crime was committed against national and ethnic groups. 
31 
 
that genocide against political groups could be prosecuted and punished under the customary 
international law. 
B. Crimes against humanity for political groups 
International courts then prefer more successful approach to impose legal responsibility 
to the defendants. Since the genocide often overlaps with crimes against humanity and it is yet 
clear to draw a line between two categories, genocide is often considered as the most severe sort 
of crime against humanity.79 This analysis is well supported by the Nuremberg legacy and 
preserved in broadening the application of crime against humanity. Therefore, international 
jurisprudence explains the groups excluded from the Convention’s protections are protected by 
crime against humanity and courts also have followed this current understanding. 
A U.N. report on Darfur follows another aspect of the international jurisprudence in 
deciding the charges for the atrocities, while the United States referred genocide in 2004. The 
commission decided to frame the prosecutions against political groups as crimes against 
humanity avoiding direct application of genocide charges.80 The commission again confirmed 
genocide crime cannot be found in Darfur because the present evidence is not sufficient to prove 
the intention to commit genocide, one of the essential elements of the crime. The report provided 
supporting testimonies proving the policy was not intentionally made to distinguish a certain 
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group from the other because the killings were conducted on random populations on merely 
arbitrary basis.81 The finding thus took an alternative approach by applying crimes against 
humanity in this situation. Luban, however, insisted this gap between the reality and legal 
application in Darfur was simply promoted by the fear that there should be a duty to intervene to 
prevent and protect in a state where the crime of genocide is conducted.82 It is less risky to frame 
it as a crime against humanity because the charge does not require the same types of moral 
burdens for U.N. or other member states to become involved. Moreover, the crimes against 
humanity charge is more successful to prosecute because the crime also prohibits extermination 
of any group, which could include a political group and does not require this as a criminal 
element.  
The tendency to avoid adoption of the common term creates empty spaces in the 
Convention’s protection. The confusion then misled the U.N. report’s conclusion to exclude the 
genocide frame in the atrocities. Luban again pointed out that the Kristic court in International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia took a different approach in deciding the crime of 
genocide, while the U.N. report did not find enough evidence for genocidal intent. The Kristic 
court found that excluding women and children from killings was a mere reflection of sensitive 
public opinion, not evidence to demonstrate the lack of genocidal intent. To the court, it was 
clearly a crime of genocide which was conducted with the specific intention to destroy a group of 
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people.83 The commission did not consider the court’s decision to make the conclusion in spite of 
similar circumstances in its disproving evidence. 
C. International courts’ decisions in genocide-like crimes 
Despite the frequent failures, international courts have been consistently challenged by 
the claims attempting to prosecute those who committed genocidal scale crimes against political 
groups. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) resolutely affirmed that the Convention’s 
intention to protect distinct groups was clearly expressed in the languages in the Article II and 
III, therefore, rejected such challenges. ICTR pointed out that, in order to warrant the 
Convention’s protection, the group must share the same nature of the enumerated groups in the 
Convention. The Court also emphasized in defining the national group the Convention protects 
“a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, 
coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”84 ICTY later reaffirmed this by finding the 
Convention provided protections to “stable and permanent groups” and political group did not 
share such characteristics.85  
Additionally, in determining the group’s existence in genocide, the ICTY adopted a 
unique approach, the subjective standard. In order to find a group’s existence, a group should be 
detected by a perpetrator’ mind which recognizes the group’s existence. This standard welcomed 
and opened the door for potential groups that may not fit into the Convention’s enumeration 
when supplementing the previous objective standard. However, the subjective standard does not 
guarantee the protections to the groups the Convention explicitly excluded, for instance, political 
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or social groups.86 Also the standard can be used on case-by-case inquiry to consider contextual 
backgrounds of the perpetration, not a general standard for the courts to rely on.87 
One of the famous arguments regarding protection of political groups has been recently 
discussed in the Extraordinary Chamber of the Courts of Cambodia, established by the U.S and 
Cambodian agreement, on whether there was in fact a genocide crime committed during 
Cambodian Khmer regime. Several debates have again challenged the Convention’s legal 
definition of the term regarding the protection of political groups for more than a decade. The 
current ECCC’s decision on Case 002/02, which involved genocide charges against previous 
political leaders who assisted Pol Pot during Khmer regime, convicted the defendants of 
committing genocide. However, the Chamber rendered the decision based on the fact that the 
perpetrators targeted national and ethnic groups confirming the intention in the Convention. The 
Chamber’s majority did not find the defendants were planning or indeed acting to terminate the 
political groups.88 
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CHAPTER IV. GENOCIDE IN THE DPRK POLITICAL CAMPS 
In order to address the genocidal harms in the DPRK political camps within the 
Convention’s protection, the major issue for such discussions will be the determination of the 
existence of a group the Convention protects. Unfortunately, the crimes occurring throughout the 
state have been committed on political grounds, failing to constitute a distinct in the Convention, 
although such persecuted seem to be categorized as a group in the society. Considering both 
Korean governments manipulated political groupness to promote the tensions between them, the 
DPRK has successfully been benefited by political persecutions in stabilizing the regime. 
Therefore, strictly applying the Convention’s interpretation, no genocide crime has been 
committed in the state. The UN DPRK report unexceptionally demonstrated the current 
application of the term in summarizing the overall atrocities in the state as crimes against 
humanity. It did not specifically discuss the chances genocide elements may have existed in the 
political camps in reaching the conclusion without legitimate grounds but mentioned the word 
‘politicide’, implying future discussions with more plausible analysis. 
 
“Such crimes might be described as a ‘politicide’. However, in a non-technical 
sense, some observers would question why the conduct detailed above was not also, by 
analogy, genocide. The Commission is sympathetic to the possible expansion of the 
current understanding of genocide. However, in light of finding many instances of 
crimes against humanity, the Commission does not find it necessary to explore these 
theoretical possibilities here…” (emphasis added).89  
 
Instead, it emphasized the magnitude of the crimes against humanity because the crime 
possibly involves a broader implementation covering overall general human right violations in 
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the state. However, as discussed above, genocide against political groups has always caused 
diverse approaches toward the interpretation of the Convention since the original texts rendered 
rare applications of the term. Here again, the massacres in the DPRK political camps requires 
more accurate diagnosis for its treatment. When other main elements are found to establish the 
crime of genocide, the interpretation of the Convention limits its capability of protection due to 
the strict textualism and discourages the further discussions for real tangible solutions. New 
interpretations for the term, therefore, shall be introduced in every possible case for 
recommendations. 
 
1. Establishing the crime in the DPRK political camps 
A prosecutor must present evidence meeting the three requirements to prosecute genocide 
crime in a court; evidence proving the defendant (i) conducted at least one of the acts described 
in the Article II of the Convention; (ii) had an intention to destroy a certain group; and (iii) 
targeted the protected group in the Convention. To convict the defendant, these three 
requirements must be satisfied the presented evidence. 
1.1. Genocidal acts in the political camps 
Article II of the Convention provides the punishable acts, defining actus reus of the 
crime: 
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
37 
 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.90 
 
According to the UN DPRK report, the commission categorized the inflictions occurring in the 
camps as tortures, executions, sexual violence, denial of family and reproductive rights, 
starvation, forced labor and diseases, deaths in custody and lack of respect for the dignity of the 
dead based on their findings.91 The inmates are extremely vulnerable to sudden deaths because 
the camp guards are ordered to kill any fugitive and the punishment process for any violation of 
camp rules are totally controlled by the officials.92 Also the commission found the death penalty 
can be imposed arbitrarily in the camps and never meet judicial process even before the accused 
inmate are under the severe tortures and long interrogation.93 Other punishments include 
reducing the ration amount, increasing the forced labor time, individual confinement, beatings 
and physical harms.94 Physical harassments and tortures are conducted in special punishment 
rooms.95 Children are not spared from suffering the harsh treatments.96 The commission 
additionally found women are to forced abortions when they are not allowed to sexually engaged 
with others and appear pregnant, furthermore, tortures and executions.97 In addition to direct 
killing with arms, the inmates are subject to “gradual extermination” due to the starvation and 
excessive labors in dangerous circumstances.98 Above all, the political camps are considered to 
be the place where the inmates are removed from the society because their bodies cannot be 
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delivered to their families.99 One of the defector’s testimony also provided the facts that while 
the inmates died from maltreatment in the prisons, when a prisoner died of dehydration, the body 
was fed to the guard’s dogs.100 
The findings obviously provide the incidents to meet the Article II’s actus reu, therefore, 
satisfying the requirement of the crime since the killings in the Article II is also compatible with 
‘caused death’ in genocide context according to the Element of rimes of the Rome Statute.101 It is 
both function and goal of establishing the political camps to drive the inmates in slow or instant 
deaths. If the findings are presented in court, moreover, the Article III’s broader inclusion of 
criminal acts can be accused as well because the totality of the inflicts would encompass 
conspiracy to commit the crime, attempt to commit and complicity. Direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide can be more plausibly found in mens rea of the crime, the mental element of 
the crime.102 
1.2. Genocidal intents built in the political camps 
Proving genocidal intent in a genocide case is the most difficult project for a successful 
conviction. However, in fact, the foundation of the political camps is the demonstration of the 
regime’s intent to commit genocide. Although no DPRK law recognizes the existence and 
implementation of the political camps, since the basis of state’s government has been made on 
the leader’s own policy, the first leader’s first policy to eradicate a certain group of people 
exhibits such intention, automatically meeting another element of the crime. As found in the 
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establishment of the camps, Kim Il-sung rendered a policy to eradicate the “class enemies” 
including private owners, future possible defectors and collaborators during the Japanese 
colonial time.103 Another policy has implement the camps by causing the gradual extinction 
“with the apparent intent to extract a maximum of economic benefit at a minimum cost” by 
imposing unbearable amount of labors in dangerous conditions, suggesting that the bottom line 
for the enforcements in the camps could be further referred as indirect manifestation of massive 
killings.104 The UN DPRK report then discovered such harms were “based on deliberate 
policy.”105 A court may require more clear evidence in order to clarify individual accountability 
regarding mens rea in each case because the UN DPRK report’s findings are made on the 
standard of reasonable basis for proofs, a lower standard than one in criminal procedures.106 But 
still the requirement is likely to be met by the quantitative approach since substantial part of the 
group has been destroyed.107 
1.3. Targeting a group in the political camps 
Although the Convention exhaustively limits the protection to the enumerated groups, it 
is still challenging to introduce a new approach toward the term of protected group within the 
DPRK context because the term ‘political’ implies in some extent different context in volume of 
the DPRK’s political persecutions. Once sent to the political camps, one has to experience 
lifetime isolation from the society. The detained in the political camps, who are usually referred 
as political prisoners, cannot receive the same protections under international law due to the 
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regime’s compulsory repatriations toward the inmates. Amnesty International provides a general 
definition of political prisoners: “those who have accused of ‘significant political element; 
whether the motivation of the prisoner’s acts, the acts in themselves, or the motivation of 
authorities.”108 But it is difficult to define ‘political’ in legal terms.   
Defining ‘political’ in legal understanding is still necessary not only in the genocide 
terms but in different cases, specifically in political refugee cases, and he U.S. federal courts 
have suggested some methods which may broaden the space for genocide cases regarding 
political persecutions. In the United States, no fixed terms or standards are settled to determine 
the political refugee cases and the courts and related agencies can use case-by-case applications 
in reviewing ‘political persecution’ cases.109 The court in Cardoza-Fonseca introduced “a 
reasonable possibility” standard to determine the existence of political persecution. INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca (1987). But the court still confirmed the basic standard in political refugee 
cases that case-by-case approach should be applied in individual cases. The Ninth Circuit then 
explained the content of the term; persecution “involves the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive. (emphasis 
added.)” According to its holding, persecution occurs when the oppressor persecutes groups or 
individuals merely because he does not want to accept the different views. Desir v. Ilchert 
(1988). Applying those rulings in the DPRK situation, crime of political persecution in 
international context could cover broader scope of violations against human rights, which are 
now occurring in the DPRK political camps. It is notable that politically persecuted refugees may 
receive different analysis from inmates in the political camps, however, since lawyers still have 
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difficulties in defining what political means in legal context and have no agreement to define the 
term and different understanding has resulted in the same text, some state jurisprudence could be 
referred in defining a legal concept in international law, to be more specific, what ‘political’ 
means in international crimes. 
Considering the DPRK’s own understanding implied by their state behaviors, the 
detained are more likely to be victims, rather than political prisoners, which should receive 
strong protections by international law. The state only distinguishes obedience from 
disobedience in politics and opponents are threats to the entire state, stigmatizing the political 
vulnerable. In addition to the long-lasting tensions existing between two Koreas for more than a 
half of a century even one single word mildly in favor of South leads to the lifetime detention in 
the camps. The political camps are total control area where one loses the citizenry and ordinary 
rights.110 The UN DPRK report’s commission found most of the inmates have to remain in the 
total control zones until they die and only those who were accused of comparatively minor 
offences are detained in the revolutionizing zone of Camp 15 expecting release in a number of 
years.111 Unlike other political criminals, therefore, the inmates in the DPRK political camps 
cannot escape from the stigmatization or victimization for their lifetime. 
Moreover, the DPRK’s policy on the involvement system is another evidence to show the 
persecution has been conducted on the groupness of the inmates. The UN DPRK report found the 
camp system has developed with the DPRK’s involvement system, “yeon-jwa-je”, based on the 
principle of “guilt by association.”112 According to the report’s findings, the involvement system 
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functions as a key determination in detaining not only the politically accused, but also the close 
family members of the accusd.113 The involvement system or system of guilt by association, 
originally based on the penal theory of collective responsibility, was first granted by the first 
leader of the regime, Kim Il-sung in the 1972 statement that “factionalists or enemies of class, 
whoever they are, their seed must be eliminated through three generations. (emphasis 
added.)”114 No membership process is required in targeting potential inmates because the system 
itself is established based on blood. When one is convicted of a political crime, his or her close 
family members are together sent to the political camps and the next two generations of the 
family would be born and live in the camp sites during their entire life.115 It has been 
successfully functioned to oppress different political ideas against the regime and more than one-
third of the inmates are assumed to be detained because of the involvement system.116  
The UN DPRK report provided striking examples of the execution of the involvement 
system as well. One unbelievable illustration of the system is given by a defector’s testimony, 
Ahn Myong-chol. Mr. Ahn found out his father was convicted of criticizing the regime while 
working for the food ration, when he visited his home town.117 His family members were already 
sent to the political camps including his elementary school student sister and he felt he would be 
soon sent to one of the camps.118 So he fled to China and finally arrived South Korea. The report 
additionally found that the government officials were not exceptional in executing the 
involvement system. The Ministry of People’s Security conducted huge investigation to sort out 
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political sensitive members from the state official’s families in 1997.119 In short, the entire 
detention process is based on the involvement system for segregation and stigmatization by 
blood, constituting extremely unchangeable status for the inmates.  
But it is highly predictable a tribunal or court may dismiss the charges of genocide crimes 
in the DPRK political camps considering the main issues will be the inclusion of political group 
in the protection. International courts strictly expressed the concerns about broadening the 
Convention’s protections to arbitrary groups because of the imports in protecting minor ‘groups’, 
while the crimes against humanity punishes the perpetrators who conduct systematic or 
widespread attacks against individuals and groups with same gravity the crime of genocide has.  
Nevertheless, it is still valuable to challenge the limited capability of the Convention in 
order to address the grave human right violations in the DPRK camps because the inmates seem 
qualified to receive the Convention’s protection by constituting a political group or, at least, 
another certain type of group with the political context. They are usually permanently persecuted 
in the camps and the involvement system of detention employs the targeting process in spite of 
the lack of enrollment to a certain membership. Such groupness is the fundamental mechanism in 
operating the camp system. Since both the ICTR and ICTY rendered decisions questioning 
which criteria should be adopted in determining the scope of the groups, there is no evident 
standard to determine the group’s stability and permanency.120 According to Nersessian’s 
analysis: 
 
“…neither permanence and stability nor inalienability of status are required by the 
Convention. And although the tribunal linked the concepts together, they are not the 
same. Voluntary membership in a group is separate from that group’s stability and 
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permanence in a given society. The ICTR conflated them and opined that individual 
choice was ipso facto inconsistent with stability and permanence. But ‘choice’ here is 
a misnomer. As discussed previously, for purpose of genocide, the relevant 
characteristics for membership in the target group are those selected by the 
genocidaire…” 121 
 
It is convincing with regards to the objective of punishing the crime that only subjective 
standard is necessary required in finding the genocidal intent. Recently, Judge Ottara wrote in the 
separate opinion on the Case 002/0a2 that, although the ICTR in Akayesu tried to build the 
concrete ground for protecting four groups in the Convention by revealing the drafters’ intention 
to protect stable and permanent groups, the Chamber has noted in the previous case that the 
drafters actually intended to protect “relatively stable and permanent groups and juxtaposed these 
from political and economic group.”122 Tefferi appealed, on the other, political group shares 
distinct stability and permanency with other protected groups.123 According to his argument, 
there is no difference between the political group and other groups so massive killings based on 
political grounds must be considered as genocide crime and when the strong rhetoric power of 
the genocide is given, more serious and cautious steps could be taken, suggesting to adopt a new 
protocol to include political group in the Convention or draft a new convention that protects any 
group of people.124 Regardless of the extensive consultations, still the detained in the DPRK 
political camps can be demonstrated as a group which needs the Convention’s protection or at 
least the political context forming such group should be incorporated with constructive 
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interpretation of the Convention to establish the genocide crime, accordingly, promote the 
implementation of the Convention’s application. 
 
2. Genocide charge to the DPRK 
One cannot discard a consistent question from the beginning of the research. Why is it 
necessary to impose a genocide charge especially for the detained in the political camps where it 
is sufficiently punishable by convicting crimes against humanity? Still it is a fundamental 
question in international law whether the crimes against humanity and crime of genocide are the 
same or totally different in essence. While some commonly adopt a perspective genocide is the 
most extreme case of crime against humanity, Altman claimed genocide is not a subcategory of 
the crimes against humanity and has a different definition for the application of the term in 
certain conditions because crimes against humanity has a distinct element, a widespread or 
systematic attack on the population, which the crime of genocide does not require.125 But after 
removing wartime nexus in crimes against humanity, it is a common confusion in establishing a 
crime especially in massive killing cases. Thus it is understandable genocide crime is more 
strictly applied to emphasize the gravity of the term. 
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Furthermore, in the DPRK situation, the genocide charge is specifically possible in 
redressing the grave human right violations especially in the political camps. Most advocates 
have attempted to prosecute the head of the state in the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
violating ICC Statute, however, it is more practical to consider bring the case in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing for the violation of the Convention. Prosecution in ICC is not 
impossible because the DPRK’s inflicts on basic human rights are against jus cogens of 
international law, but it may take more considerable works to bring the charge because the 
DPRK did not join the Rome Statute or ICC statute. Considering the complexity in the current 
diplomacy on East Asian region, political pressure is needed to promote the criminal prosecution 
but some are expressing negative comments. Also due to the state’s exclusiveness, it is hardly 
accessible to collect evidence for individual accountability. Rather, if the international 
community wishes to offer remedy to rescue the victims, a court should impose responsibility to 
the state. Above all, nonetheless, the detained in the political camps are exposed extremely 
vulnerable since the entire camp site can be erased abruptly on the state leader’s arbitrary 
standard. 
2.1. Prosecuting the state head in ICC 
Several advocates have attempted to bring a charge against the current DPRK leader, 
Kim Jong-un, in the ICC in Hague. Three prominent jurists, Navy Pillay, a former UN high 
commissioner for human right, Mark Harmon in a tribunal for accusing Khmer Rouge leader in 
Cambodia, and Thomas Buergenthal, a survivor from Auschwitz and a previous ICJ judge, wrote 
a report accusing Kim for committing crimes against humanity in the political camps in 2017.126 
                                                          
126 Associated Press in Washington, Kim Jong-un should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity, say jurists, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 12. 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/international-jury-kim-jong-un-
should-be-prosecuted-for-human-rights-crimes  
47 
 
The young leader has also faced several petitions for the state’s unlawful practice in international 
law and the latest one to prosecute Kim for suspected kidnapping Japanese citizens was 
dismissed by ICC in 2018 as the court rejected to open a case.127 Despite the consistent efforts to 
prosecute Kim in the court, there has been no case opened by the court yet to summon Kim for 
the further procedure. 
Since the DPRK is not a state party to Rome Statute, to initiate the investigation, the U.N. 
Security Council is expected to refer the case to the court based on the U.N. Charter Chapter 
VII.128 When a state is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Security Council can adopt a measure 
to address the peace-threatening situation and this is the only gateway for the DPRK to be 
prosecuted in the ICC. ICC would be the admit the case because the state cannot establish a 
judicial process to prosecute the criminals, who are still in the high-level positions with absolute 
powers.129 In 2017, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution to invite human rights 
experts to prepare the judicial process for the state’s grave human rights violations.130 However, 
despite the increasing voice of the advocates, other experts have expressed a feeling of doubt and 
uncertainty about proceeding the criminal procedures for the court. Considering the Security 
Council includes China and Russia, old allies of the DPRR with currently economic 
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relationships, it is highly foreseeable that they would remain opposing to take a measure to the 
DPRK. If so, such result would decrease the pressure on the state and discourage the advocates 
from resolviing the issues. Furthermore, the U.S. is pessimistic toward the foundation and 
effectiveness of the international criminal court, although the resolution on Darfur was adopted 
without the U.S.’s opposition.131 Thus it remains unclear whether the Security Council would 
support the initiating process to bring the issues in the criminal court. 
Rather there is another path to a different court, the ICJ, for the DPRK’s violation of the 
Genocide Convention. If the Security Council hesitates to adopt an agreed resolution to initiate 
the process for criminal accountability in the DPRK, experts should consider assisting a state to 
bring a charge against the DPRK for the violation of the Convention. Compared to the criminal 
procedure provided by the Rome Statute for ICC to prosecute a non-member state, a U.N. 
member state can file a case to ICJ for the violation of an international convention.132 The DPRK 
has been a member state to the Genocide Convention since 1989 without reservation and also 
joined the U.N. in 1991.133 Thus a complaint by a member state that the DPRK’s detention and 
devastating treatments of the inmates in the camps were constituting the crime of genocide and 
in violation of the Genocide Convention can be brought to the court and if the court does not find 
lack of jurisdiction, the DPRK should defense in the court. 
2.2. State responsibility 
                                                          
131 S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
132 U.N. Charter art. 93. “1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.” 
133 Regarding the reservation to the Convention, ICJ provided an advisory opinion on the issue. It found the unique 
objects of the Convention must be considered, humanitarian and civilizing purpose, which yields a common interest, 
not individual state interest. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951. I.C.J.14 (May. 28). A state should consider the objects of the Convention in filing a case 
against the genocide charge to the DPRK.  
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While it is still unclear whether the DPRK would agree to the court procedure, it should 
be noted that accusing state responsibility for the violation of the international convention would 
render faster remedies to the victims in this case since international criminal law provides 
punishments based on individual accountability. Even though recent inquiries have reached to 
charge the state for committing crimes against humanity, the state seems to remain exclusive and 
isolated despite the limited economic activities, burdening the investigators in collecting 
sufficient evidence. Several efforts to archive remaining evidence and updated testimonies have 
been consistently made but, on the other hand, raised questions in supporting the charges in 
individual indictments.134 The standard of proof is expected to be higher for the criminal 
proceedings, specifically requiring intent for committing the crimes prohibited by the 
international law and not likely to be met by the current collection of the evidence. One may 
have to merely suppose and expect a situation for the state to voluntarily cooperate in offering 
the records and information to establish individual indictments and such waiting would highly 
postpone the future remedies for the victims. 
Regarding ICJ can establish a state responsibility to the state for the violation of the 
Convention, however, the inquiries’ findings can be presented as circumstantial evidence to ICJ 
in accusing the DPRK. In the case of Corfu Channel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Albania, the Court admitted circumstantial evidence to establish a 
responsibility, as the “‘circumstantial evidence’ must be regarded as of special weight when it is 
                                                          
134 Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), a private association established in 2003, has 
published biographical dictionary to record the identification of the staffs and inmates including disappeared ones to 
provide evidence for future prosecutions. See NKHR, 북한 정치범수용소 근무자, 수감자 및 실종자 인명사전 
[NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL PRISON CAMPS: A CATALOGUE OF POLITICAL PRISON CAMP STAFF, DETAINEES, AND 
VICTIMS OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE] (2016). 
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based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion.”135 
Although still the difference between standard of beyond reasonable doubt and the Court’s 
conclusion for such proof is not clear, even the dissenting judges in the case agreed to admit the 
circumstantial evidence to hear.136 It is more likely, therefore, to find the state in the violation of 
the international convention based on the findings rather than establishing individual 
accountability for committing international crimes. 
2.3. Need to protect the group in the camps 
Besides other reasons to establish justice in the state, it is fundamentally necessary to 
rescue the detained in the political camps. The system is serving for the arbitrary decisions, while 
other different facilities the regime has operated for similar purposes are built on the statutes or 
laws regardless of the legality of the execution of the rules. But as the existence of camps has 
been steadily denied by the state, the camps would easily disappear without record when the 
regime changes its strategy toward the outside. Considering the state has gradually attempts to 
build economic relationships with others, to stabilize the instate circumstances, the state may 
impose stricter policies to the famous denouncing institution by instantly eradicating the 
existence of such sites. Current closure of the certain camp sites does not seem to evidence the 
changes of the implementing policy or public awareness of sensitive issues but reflects the 
vulnerable status of the political camps which is arbitrarily employed by the regime or sole 
leadership of the state.137 
 
                                                          
135 George Dorby, The Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Establish International Responsibility 44 TRANSACTIONS 
OF THE GROTIUS SOCI’Y 63, 70 (1958). 
136 Id. 68-70. 
137 KOREAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Supra 367. 
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3. Recommendations 
Therefore, the interpretation of the genocide for the detainees in the DPRK political 
camps should be incorporated to current existing norm in understanding the real atrocities 
receiving the weight of the term. The current norm preserved by the international courts’ 
decisions should be challenged as well with three possible suggestions. First, the original texts of 
the Convention would remain unchanged by incorporating different approaches to read the 
Convention. Judge Ottara’s opinion to broaden the scope of the genocide term encompasses a 
chance a court may hear genocide committed in political context. Another recommendation then 
is drafting or devising a new amendment to the Convention to include political group in the text 
or adopting a protocol to the Convention to broaden the scope of protection. The new devises 
would be more directly affects the practical implementation of the interpretation. But in the 
DPRK case, the most plausible scenario would be establishing a statute for domestic justice 
procedure or a transitional justice government since it is more difficult to gain consensus to 
change the international convention agreed by various states. 
3.1.Reserving the texts with different approach 
Judge Ottara, seating in the Chamber to hear the Case 002/02 to prosecute the closest 
supporters to the previous political leader of genocide crime, opined separately in the judgement 
by presenting his perspective for broader application of genocide.138 He found by adopting 
subjective standard the “as such” part of the Convention’s article was drafted in awareness of 
different motives to intent genocide and confirmed a sole membership status is required to 
receive the protection as a group.139 He agreed with the Chamber’s finding that the phrase was 
                                                          
138 Case 002/02, Prosecutors v. Nuon Chea et al, Judge You Ottara’s Separate Opinion on Genocide (Prolai Pouch-
sas) Supra. 
139 Id. ¶4509. 
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intentionally written to protect an existence of a group, not individuals.140 Regarding the 
interpretation of the Article II of the Convention, he concluded no requirement for distinguishing 
certain groups as the article limits the protection and the enumerated protected groups should be 
determined based on various factors and “consideration should be given to the political, social 
and cultural context.”141 His distinct opinion is remarkable to suggest political factors in 
genocide crime in a way most jurists have hesitated to adopt political relevant issues. If his 
opinion is reflected in future applications, the Convention can be read with more individual 
analysis to protect political groups. 
Without a modification to the existing text, a strategy to only broaden the scope of the 
application in interpreting the genocide would not infringe the general principle of interpretation 
of treaty. To incorporate such perspective for further development of the Convention, a judge 
should remind the guidelines provided by the Vienna Convention in order to make the 
application legally persuasive. There is no hierarchy between international treaties including 
human right agreements. Therefore, the Genocide Convention should be interpreted in 
accordance with the article 31 of the Vienna Convention, following the general rules of the 
interpretation.142 The Vienna Convention then provides supplemental means to facilitate the 
interpretation of the Convention when the first interpretation of the treaty renders an empty 
conclusion or unreasonable consequences in the article 32.143 Current interpretation of the 
                                                          
140 Id. ¶4512. 
141 Id. ¶4516.  
142 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May. 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 art. 31. “1. A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which 
was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty…” 
143 Id. art. 32. “Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
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Convention implying exclusion of political group in genocide charges would lead to the 
unreasonable result specifically in the DPRK situations if the detainees cannot receive proper 
remedies from international assistance. But such challenge still has to wait longer period of time 
to witness the altering moment of the term because the courts would need more substantial time 
to review the prominent norm which have supported by international understandings.   
Interpretations on human rights cases in European Convention on Human Rights may 
suggest useful methods.144 One may disregard to adopt a different approach specifically in 
interpreting human rights treaties because all treaties are and should be equally authorized. 
However, the flexible methods took by the European Court of Human Rights in human right 
cases could referred in justifying the predicted unreasonable consequences of the current 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention in the DPRK case. The Court affirmed to protect 
practical and effective rights in human rights cases. Moreover, continued to consider different 
principles in reviewing human right cases in order to promote the dynamic implementation of 
human rights. 145 In interpreting an international treaty, no hierarchy between the treaties should 
be recognized, however, in interpreting a human right treaty, one could consider the unique 
characteristic of such agreements for the ultimate objective in protecting and promoting 
vulnerable human rights. Human right treaties are not ratified to promote one state’s interest but 
                                                          
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable (emphasis added).” 
144 Bok-Hee Chang, Interpretation and Application of Treaty: In the perspective of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (조약의 해석 및 적용: 유럽인권협약을 중심으로), 19 GNU L. REV. 365 (2011). 
145 Airey v. Ireland (Appeal No. 6289/73), ECtHR (Oct. 9, 1979); Delcourt v. Belgium (Appeal No. 2689/65), 
ECtHR (Jan. 17, 1970). 
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to provide fundamental protections for mostly universal jurisdiction. In this regard, some works 
of “art” would benefit the interpretation of the treaties.146 
3.2. New amendment or protocol to the Convention 
A more concrete way to provide the basis for inclusion of political group to the 
Convention can be made with different texts provided by a new amendment or protocol to the 
Convention. But the efforts to gain worldwide consensus for such changes are not simple, as 
expected. Critics of the Convention’s exclusion on political groups once provoked the United 
States Senate to consider proposing an amendment to the Convention while the Senate 
contemplated the ratification of the Convention.147 A question was raised during the discussions 
for fundamental reason for the proposal; is a new amendment is only way to stop the genocide 
against political groups? As the U.S. Senates have faced, a state to propose an amendment or 
new protocol to add political group as a new protected group to the Convention must rebut the 
drafters’ original intention for the exclusion and convince the international community to 
approve a new challenge. Regarding the utility and political risks in proposing a new 
amendment, mere reliance on the state’s action to change the international norm would take 
enormous time to bring a change. 
3.3. Domestic procedure or transitional justice process 
The most persuasive way to incorporate new interpretation to protect the DPRK 
genocidal victims would be proceeding judicial process in the domestic level or, more possibly, 
through transitional justice time. It is more difficult to revise or amend an existing international 
                                                          
146 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 230 (2007). “…the interpretation of document is to 
some extent an art, not an exact science.” 
147 Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States 
Propose an Amendment? 13 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 268, 280 (1988.) 
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convention than establishing a case in national system because less state practice to lighten the 
notion to protect political groups in genocide is found. Nevertheless, some states have legislated 
and decided to punish the perpetrators committing genocide in political context or against a 
certain political group like France and Ethiopia and more states have become aware of the 
gravity the genocidal incidents which occurred out of the scope of the old protection. If more 
states agree to punish the genocide committed against political groups or in political context, 
such consensus would affect to lower the standard to more various groups, protecting more 
diversity in modern societies. 
If the DPRK voluntarily establishes a certain procedure to prosecute the perpetrators, 
some grounds should be made to exercise the jurisdiction. First, legislators should be aware that 
the entire process to the political camps are promoted by genocidal intent to eradicate a group of 
people for their political basis. The thesis does not include purview in defining of ‘political’ 
specifically in such criminal offences, however, it should be noted that political context is a 
major factor constituting the political offences in the distinct individual case. Secondly, a penal 
code should be drafted to punish and prevent the genocide crimes in the state. Although the 
implementation of the political camps was based on arbitrary standards easily influenced by the 
political decisions, the punishment and justice process to address the problem should be written 
in law for its legality and legitimacy. Finally, to establish a fair and just precedent to prevent 
future atrocities, international aids must be provided throughout the process. Although the state 
itself proceeds the justice process on the domestic or transitional justice grounds, there should be 
an organization or a set of cooperation from the outside to watch and observe the entire process. 
One should remember during the justice process the awful crimes committed in the DPRK camps 
are not a national issue but international crime that threated the peace of mankind on the globe. 
56 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Genocide Convention was drafted in awareness that a great power may destroy a 
group of people in massive scales. The drafters at first considered a political group could face 
such threats in certain situations, however, eventually devised a draft to exclusively include only 
four groups to protect – national, racial, ethnic and religious groups. They could not predict 
future atrocities now occurring in the present concentration camps, the DPRK political camps. 
DPRK has still refused to respond to the inquiries accusing the state’s implementation of 
political camps to persecute its citizens. It is barely possible to initiate the field investigation to 
archive direct evidence to prepare individual indictments, however, several official reports 
published by the U.N. and other state authorities revealed the horrible atrocities, once described 
as worse than the Nazi concentration camps, to the world and promoted international cooperation 
to redress. Due to the state’s isolation, it is estimated around 5 or 6 camps are currently under 
operation. The North Korean defectors as well provided testimonies regarding the grave 
inflictions in the camps. The inmates in the political camps have been exposed to overall 
dangerous circumstances. Extreme labor is assigned to every inmate regardless of their age, 
gender and physical status, and functions to punish them, gradually exterminating their 
existence. Besides the devasting circumstance in the camps, the inmates are also under the threat 
of harassment by the guards. Women and children are facing more vulnerable situations. 
Children die of malnutrition and are sometimes forced to watch the physical violence and 
tortures occurring in front of them. Family rights and reproductive right are also prohibited in the 
camps, however, some women are pregnant after raped by the camp guards and they are forced 
to have an abortion, cannot help witnessing their own baby being killed just after the birth.  
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However, although the intention of eradication is clearly manifested by the operation of 
the political camp system, the Genocide Convention would not apply to the victims because the 
detainees constitute a political group, which the Convention did not intend to protect. The Article 
II of the Genocide Convention provides a exhaustive list of the protected groups, excluding other 
groups from the protection, although the draft of the Convention once included political group in 
the list. Critics argued the omission of political group during the drafting history was caused by 
unknown political compromise because no records have explained legal grounds to suddenly 
exclude certain groups. But later the international courts have confirmed the Convention 
explicitly expressed its power in protecting certain groups’ existence because the protected 
groups distinguishable due to the stability and permanence and political group lacked such 
characteristics to receive proper protections from the Genocide Convention.  
The ignorance or unexpected failure to see more severe tragedies occurring today for 
political polarization, such as the extreme harassments in the DPRK political camps, have 
triggered attentions to the inherent limitations of the Convention which cannot rescue the most 
vulnerable lives. Advocates, therefore, had to devise some alternatives to address grave human 
right violations in genocidal situations but not in genocide crimes. To punish the international 
crime where international law does not provide appropriate steps or measures, states have 
legislated domestic laws to prosecute perpetrators who committed genocide against any groups 
including political groups. France has its own penal code for convicting genocide with more 
encompassing scope to cover the crime and Ethiopian transitional justice government enacted 
law to punish the genocidal criminals and successfully established an inspiring precedent finding 
the defendants guilty of committing genocide against certain political groups. In addition, some 
international advocates argued specifically in investigating the Cambodian atrocities, to 
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prosecute the leader and supports of the previous regime who persecuted several groups and 
individuals on political grounds, customary international law can provide legal basis for 
indictments. But the challenges are rarely acceptable to the courts because rather than directly 
discussing and applying the genocide charge against the perpetrators, the judges seating in 
international courts are inclined to render the decision based on the accusation of criminal 
against humanity, which increases the chances to convict the defendants. The Cambodian 
judgement recently again confirmed genocide crime is committed against national and ethnic 
groups, despite the controversial challenges for decades to protect Cambodian political groups in 
genocidal crimes. 
The DPRK’s violations in the political camps should be framed as a genocide crime 
considering the purpose in establishing the institutes, nevertheless. Other criminal elements are 
met to establish a genocide crime except the persecuted are gathered on political grounds where 
the political group cannot be protected by the Convention. However, the groupness of the 
detainees in the political camps differs from other political associations in general terms due to 
the unique contexts in the DPRK politics. The detention process to the political camps is 
basically a process of stigmatization of persons, imposing lifetime stigmas to remain in the 
camps. The inmates, once sent to the camps, permanently become segregated and gradually 
eradicated for the regime’s policy. The lifetime detentions including enormous inflicts leading to 
“gradual eradication” of the inmates manifests the stable existence of a certain group, a political 
group or national group with particular political contexts.148 
                                                          
148 Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic Peoples’ 
Republic of Korea, Supra ¶767. 
59 
 
It is essential to discuss genociade charges in the political camps, therefore, because 
while some experts deliberately work on to bring a charge against the state leader of crimes 
against humanity for violating human rights in the state, others cannot guarantee the further 
developments for such approaches. If the preparation takes more than expected, it would more 
beneficial to the victims to call for the state responsibility in ICJ than filing individual criminal 
charges waiting for the ICC or other ad hoc tribunals. Considering the state’s silence and 
stubbornness with risky provocations toward outside world, a faster method is preferably 
implemented to relieve the tensions caused by grave inflicts. A successful establishment of 
genocide charge can gain more attentions to rescue the victims in the hidden sites of the camps. 
Therefore, incorporation or addition of political group to the interpretation of the genocide 
should be made either in reserving the original texts with adopting such interpretation by the 
courts or proposing a new amendment or protocol to facilitate the current interpretation 
regarding the protecting political groups in genocide crimes. But it is infeasible to obtain 
consensus from the international community to challenge the existing international norm. The 
most practical way to implement the incorporation would be establishing a legislation and 
judicial decision to protect the detainees in the political camps from the genocide crime by 
domestic justice system or, if possible, throughout the transitional justice process. 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is not to create a new norm or rule to change the 
existing prominent rule but to provide a new forum to discuss the specific incidents in the 
DPRK’s political camps where humans are persecuted on political grounds. Moreover, the 
DPRK’s political camp sites are not the only occasion which needs analysis in genocide frame. 
Sadly, still humans are inflicted by absolute political powers and the victimized ones are exposed 
to more obstacles when the law cannot regulate the powers. The political group in normal sense 
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is an association to accomplish certain political idea to bring a change or secure the world. But in 
today’s extreme polarized world with different ideas, the meaning of ‘political’ could harm 
persons by targeting them as enemies. The current norm of genocide should incorporate the 
transformations in its own term to provide strong protections to undefined or unclassified groups 
according to the old interpretations. One is entitled to live free regardless of his or her political 
status and cannot be inflicted by own belief and existence. I close this argument in hoping to 
bring freedom and the justice to the victims in the DPRK political camps and similar potential 
tragedies. 
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